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ABSTRACT
A central question in creativity concerns how insightful ideas emerge. Anecdotal
examples of insightful scientific and technical discoveries include Goodyear’s dis-
covery of the vulcanization of rubber, and Mendeleev’s realization that there may
be gaps as he tried to arrange the elements into the Periodic Table. Although
most people would regard these discoveries as insightful, cognitive psychologists
have had difficulty in agreeing on whether such ideas resulted from insights or
from conventional problem solving processes. One area of wide agreement among
psychologists is that insight involves a process of restructuring. If this view is
correct, then understanding insight and its role in problem solving will depend on
a better understanding of restructuring and the characteristics that describe it.
This article proposes and tests a preliminary classification of insight problems
based on several restructuring characteristics: the need to redefine spatial as-
sumptions, the need to change defined forms, the degree of misdirection involved,
the difficulty in visualizing a possible solution, the number of restructuring
sequences in the problem, and the requirement for figure-ground type reversals.
A second purpose of the study was to compare performance on classic spatial
insight problems with two types of verbal tests that may be related to insight, the
Remote Associates Test (RAT), and rebus puzzles. In doing so, we report on the
results of a survey of 172 business students at the University of Waikato in New
Zealand who completed classic-type insight, RAT and rebus problems.
Keywords: Insight problem solving, creative problem solving, spatial insight
problems, remote associates, rebus puzzles
INTRODUCTION
Many scientific discoveries appear to involve a type of creative problem solv-
ing that involves transformational shifts in approaching the problem. Examples
include Goodyear’s discovery of the vulcanization of rubber, Banting and Best’s
development of insulin to treat diabetes, and Mendeleev’s realization that there
may be gaps as he tried to arrange the elements into the Periodic Table (Akin,
Akin & Heinz III, 1996; Kedrov, 1966-1967). A distinctive characteristic of these
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discoveries is the experience of a “breakthrough”, where the problem solver is
able to move from not knowing how to solve a problem to a feeling of knowing
how to proceed (Mayer, 1996). The concept of insight was introduced by Gestalt
psychologists over 75 years as a way of describing this apparently unique prob-
lem solving process. Insight is described as “restructuring” — a radical, and often
sudden, change in how a problem is conceived (Weisberg, 1996).
Insight involves modifying or rejecting previously accepted assumptions (Newell
& Simon, 1972) and accepting more appropriate ones (Sternberg & Davidson,
1983; Schooler & Melcher, 1995; Smith, Ward & Finke, 1995; Tardif & Sternberg,
1988). It is “. . . seeing a problem in a new light, often without awareness of how
the new light was switched on” (Jung-Beeman, Bowden, Haberman, Frymiare,
Arambel-Liu, Greenblatt, Paul, Reber, & Kounios, 2004: 507). Weisberg (1996)
suggests that insight occurs when a problem is solved through restructuring. For
this to occur, a problem solver “must carry out multiple solutions attempts, and
the correct solution must be the result of a problem representation different from
that which was the basis of the initial solution(s)” (Weisberg, 1996: 164). Jung-
Beeman et al., (2004) suggested four features which might describe insight. Prob-
lem solvers become stuck or face an impasse; solvers cannot usually report the
processing leading to the solution; solvers find that the solution arises suddenly:
and performance on insight problems is connected to cognitive and creative pro-
cesses which are very different than for non-insight problems.
However, to others, insight problem solving entails the same processes as
normal problem solving, and involves no emergent properties. In experiments
using the 9-dot, 4-dot, and triangles problem, Weisberg and Alba (1981) con-
cluded that insight and fixation do not help explain the problem solving process.
They emphasized that the solution to insight problems, in two of the problems
they studied, can be explained in other ways. That is, “people apply their knowl-
edge to new problems, and if their knowledge is not directly useful, they try to
produce something new that will solve the problem through a straightforward
extension of what they know. No exotic processes, such as a sudden insight, are
involved” (Weisberg & Alba, 1981: 189). The two sides to this debate are described
as the “special-process” and the “business-as-usual’ views.
If insight involves restructuring processes, the heart of understanding insight
and its role in problem solving seems to rely on a better understanding of restruc-
turing and the characteristics that describe it. It has been suggested that there
may be different forms of restructuring (Ohlsson, 1992; Weisberg, 1996). In addi-
tion, some problems which are thought to require insight might not be solved
through a classical definition of insight (Weisberg, 1996). The main purpose of
this article is to develop a better understanding of types of restructuring which
might distinguish between different insight problems. A secondary purpose is to
examine performance on two other types of problem (Remote Associates and
rebus puzzles) whose solutions potentially may involve restructuring. In pursuing
these purposes, we report on the results of a survey of 172 business students
at the University of Waikato in New Zealand who completed insight tests and
classic-type insight problems.
Our review of the recent literature reveals the importance of restructuring in
understanding insight and the character of different types of insight problems.
The following paragraphs review different views of restructuring and how six
restructuring characteristics might be used to classify different insight problems.
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Types of restructuring
Weisberg (1996) conducted a conceptual analysis of a sample of candidate
insight problems, and concluded that the associated restructurings were striking
in their heterogeneity, a factor that he considered a challenge for a single-process
theory of restructuring. Previously, Ohlsson (1992) had proposed three different
types of restructuring; elaboration, re-encoding and constraint relaxation. Elabo-
ration refers to a representational change brought about by the addition of infor-
mation, which can be productive if the original representation is incomplete.
Re-encoding is described as “…rejecting one or more layers of interpretation”
and reaching a new interpretation of the problem. Both elaboration and re-encod-
ing are considered to involve the initial problem state. In contrast, the third mecha-
nism, constraint relaxation, is defined in terms of changing an initially constrained
or inappropriate representation of the goal state.
Ansburg and Dominowski (2000) used Ohlsson’s taxonomy to categorize
verbal insight problems. They reported difficulty in finding multiple examples
involving re-encoding, and classified 60 problems as involving either elaboration
or constraint relaxation (or “other”), to a level of 100% agreement between two
judges. The purpose was to help develop training procedures aimed at the differ-
ent restructuring processes. What they found, however, was that training on prob-
lems, supposed to involve only elaboration, facilitated subsequent performance
on both elaboration and constraint relaxation problems to an equal degree. They
conjectured that the training directed specifically at the mechanism of elabora-
tion had in fact a more general effect at a higher procedural level.
An alternative explanation of the Ansburg and Dominowski (2000) finding is
that there is, in fact, no real distinction between the proposed types of restructur-
ing. While Ansburg and Dominowski’s two raters achieved 100% agreement in
their classifications, the distinction between some problems appears potentially
subjective and equivocal, and there are instances of discrepancies in the litera-
ture. For example, while Ansburg and Dominowski (2000) classified the prisoner
and rope problem (Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987) as requiring elaboration, Isaak and
Just (1996) described it as an example of constraint relaxation. Also, Isaak and
Just considered the pendulum solution to Maier’s (1931) two strings problem
to involve constraint relaxation, while Ohlsson (1992) presented it as an example
of re-encoding.
One reason why such inconsistencies arise is because different authors con-
ceptualize the associated solution processes in different ways. Weisberg (1996),
for example, has noted that Ohlsson’s (1984) analysis of the steps involved in
solving the “Two strings” problem differed from Maier’s (1931) analysis. The coin
triangle problem (Metcalfe, 1986a) is another example where different interpreta-
tions of the required restructuring have been offered. The problem is to reverse a
triangular arrangement of 10 coins by moving three coins only. (See Figure 1.)
FIGURE 1.
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The restructuring required to solve the coin triangle problem has been inter-
preted in several different ways. Weisberg (1996) describes the restructuring in
terms of an initial perception of an undifferentiated collection of coins to one of a
central rosette flanked by three moveable coins. Metcalfe (1986b) provides a simi-
lar interpretation. In contrast, Isaak and Just (1996) describe the insight solution
in terms of translational moves across the median axis, rather than rotational
moves, as illustrated in Figure 1. Chronicle, MacGregor & Ormerod (2004) found
that, of 36 correct solutions, 8 were compatible with the representation on the left
and 19 with the one on the right. They also provided evidence that the latter solu-
tion was consistent with a hill-climbing strategy that did not require restructuring.
The example demonstrates that, even with a “standard” insight problem, issues
exist as to the nature of the restructuring presumed to underlie the insight or, in
this case, whether the solution involves insight at all.
While Ohlsson’s (1992) theory represents an important contribution that pro-
vided a stimulus to the field, the psychological reality of the proposed types of
restructuring remains unproven, as Ohlsson himself recognized (Ohlsson, 1992).
As noted above, one of the difficulties in identifying types of restructuring may be
that different researchers adopt different, possibly incorrect, assumptions about
the restructuring required to solve a given problem. In addition, there is no gener-
ally-accepted definition of an “insight problem” (Chronicle, MacGregor & Ormerod,
2004; Weisberg, 1996). Indeed, the term “insight problem” should be regarded
as a relative term, where a problem that involves insight for one person may not
for another.
Selection of insight problems
To explore the possibility of different forms of restructuring, we first selected a
set of problems to examine. This selection was guided by several criteria. First,
we restricted the choice to problems that involved a strong spatial component.
We did so because the originators of the concept of restructuring typically used
examples of this type (Wertheimer, 1945), as did classic empirical studies of
the phenomenon (Duncker, 1945; Maier, 1931). Second, we selected problems
that covered a relatively wide range of difficulty (limited by the constraint that
problems involving insight are typically difficult to solve). Third, we chose prob-
lems that had been associated with insight solutions in previous research, or that
were analogs of such problems. The problems and their source(s) are shown
in Table 1.
For the ten problems, there were four types of evidence that solutions involve
insight. The first was evidence that the solution appeared suddenly or unexpect-
edly, using “feeling of warmth” ratings (Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987) or other means.
This was the case for problems 1 (Chronicle et al, 2004), 2, 8, 9 & 10 (Metcalfe
& Wiebe, 1987) in Table 1. The second was evidence that solution rates were
increased through training designed to facilitate insight. This applied to problems
1, 5 and 7 (Cunningham & MacGregor, 2008) and problems 3, 4, 5, and 6 (Walinga,
2007). The third was evidence of differential effects of verbal overshadowing on
solving insight and non-insight problems (Schooler, Ohlsson & Brooks, 1993).
This supported our selection of problems 2 and 4. The fourth was evidence based
on a clustering analysis of 34 problems, 24 of which were thought to involve
insight (Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005). The results supported our selection of prob-
lems 2 and 4, but also suggested that problem 10 may be solved without insight.
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CHARACTERISTICS DEFINING CLASSIC-TYPE INSIGHT PROBLEMS
Our understanding of previous studies and our experimental research on puzzle-
like and realistic problems (Cunningham and MacGregor, 2008) helped us
define five characteristics which might be involved in insight problems. In addi-
tion, in order to encourage an open-ended, inductive approach to identifying
characteristics, we used a structured procedure called the RepGrid (Repertory
Grid) or Role Construct Repertory Test (Kelly, 1955). The RepGrid technique was
devised by Kelly to assist in counselling his clients, although it has been applied
in other settings (Bannister & Mair, 1968; Walker & Winter, 2007). In our applica-
tion, two of the authors independently carried out a series of comparisons based
on different subsets of the 10 insight problems shown in Table 1).
The comparison procedure consisted of randomly selecting three problems
and identifying an insight characteristic shared by two of the problems and not by
the third. Implicit in our minds was that the characteristic should be related to the
restructuring necessary to solve the problem. Each author independently carried
out the procedure five times, which helped us in clarifying and focusing our char-
acteristics and in identifying two new characteristics (#2 and #6 below) and in
discarding another.
We propose that insight problems can be described by restructuring character-
istics such as: the need to redefine spatial assumptions; the need to change
defined structures or forms; the degree of misdirection involved; the difficulty
in visualizing a possible solution; the number of restructuring sequences in the
problem; and the requirement for figure-ground type reversals.
1. The need to redefine spatial assumptions. Some insight problems require
a shift in one or more spatial assumptions involving the arrangement of ob-
jects, connection of words or phrases, or the visual placement of materials.
Such problems illustrate the movement of an object in a one dimensional space,
changing the perspective (from back to front, or from side to side) from which
to view the problem, or altering the type of assumptions (spatial, visual, rela-
tionship, or language use). Examples might include the six coin problem (de-
scribed below) or carpentry operations which might involve altering the
direction of a heating pipe. MacGregor and Cunningham (2008) classified
100 rebus problems and identified 16 different principles or assumptions that
problem solvers might have to reinterpret in solving a problem. The most fre-
quently identified assumption in 61% of the 100 instances, required problems
solvers to re-interpret spatial relations or positions of words. Individual rebuses
ranged from having a minimum of one to a maximum of four of these differ-
ent principles. The experimental results indicated that participants solved more
problems that involved breaking one assumption than two or more, suggest-
ing that problems with more assumptions were more difficult to solve.
2. The need to change defined structures or forms. Several insight problems
require that the problem solver either dismantle, change, or restructure
an existing form or figure before developing something new, as in the coin
triangle or necklace problems. Others are unstructured and require only
the construction or structuring based on an array of the evidence and smaller
parts, such as the cross. This may be analogous to the transformational
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TABLE 1. Description of Problems Used in Survey.
Problem definition and script given Illustration given
1. Arrange six coins to touch: Draw how
to arrange 6 coins so that each coin
touches exactly two others (forming
them in a ring is not allowed)
Source: Chronicle et al., (2004).
2. Reversing triangle by moving three
coins: By moving three coins only
rearrange the triangle so that it points
downwards. (Use a check to indicate
coins to be moved, and use arrows to
show where they are to be moved to.
Sources: Dow & Mayer (2004);
Gilhooly & Murphy (2005); Metcalfe
and Wiebe (1987).
3. Move three sticks to form new pattern:
By moving three sticks only can you
change the pattern on the left to look
like the pattern on the right? (Use a
check mark [✔] to indicate sticks to be
moved, and use arrows to show where
they move to). Source: Adapted from
Kokinov et al., (1997).
4. Separate pigs in pigpen: Can you add
2 more squares so that each pig is in
a pen of its own?
Source: Gilhooly & Murphy (2005);
Isaak and Just (1996).
5. Sketch the cross: Can you sketch
how to arrange these 5 pieces of
wood to form a cross shape
(like a plus sign).
Source: Adapted from the T-puzzle,
Suzuki, Abe, Hiraki &  Miyazaki
(2001).
1 2
5
3 4
.. .. ..
.. .. ..
.. .. ..
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6. Arrange 12 discs. Can you arrange
the 12 discs so that each side of the
hexagon contains 4 discs?
Source: New problem.
7. Arrange 12 cards: Here are 12 cards
from a standard deck — 4 Kings,
Queens and Jacks. The task is to
arrange them in a grid — a table —
so that each row and each column
contains only one Jack, one Queen
and one King. Try to draw how this
could be done.
Source: Cunningham & MacGregor
(2008).
8. Separate animals into 4 pens: How
can all of 27 animals be placed in 4
pens so that there is an odd number
of animals in each pen?
Sources: Metcalfe (1986a).
9. Divide field into four equal parts: A
farmer wants to divide the field shown
below into four equally shaped parts
so that each of his 4 sons receives
and equal share. How can it be done?
Sources: Dow & Mayer (2004);
Gilhooly & Murphy (2005); Metcalfe
and Wiebe (1987); Weisberg (1996).
10. You have 4 pieces of a chain neck-
lace that you want to make into a
single circle, as shown. It costs $2 to
open a link and $3 to close a link.
You have a total of $15. How can the
four strands be connected into a
single chain?
Source: Metcalfe (1986a); Metcalfe &
Wiebe (1987).
No illustration given
K K K K
Q Q Q Q
J J J J
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experiences required in redesigning an existing organization as opposed to
designing a new one where there are no existing structures and procedures to
dismantle. In the same sense, Wii’s inventors redesigned the remote (control-
ler) and devised a Wiimote to allow players to move about a room in playing
a video game while IPod’s inventors re-configured the physical dimensions
of a hard drive so that it could be used for listening to music while walking
and running.
3. The degree of misdirection involved. Some insight problems misdirect the
problem solver away from a possible solution because the information defin-
ing them is misleading. Some insight problems (arranging 12 discs or placing
all animals in 4 pens) might illustrate some misdirection, as the solution
requires the twisting of the meaning of certain words beyond their conven-
tional usage. Misdirection can also result because problem solvers assume
that one approach is more acceptable than others or that a new and promis-
ing solution path might not be fruitful. For example, scientists were wedded to
a view that there were no new planets in the Kuiper Belt area where Pluto
exists. Even when a larger body was discovered, it was rejected as not being a
planet (even though it had similar qualities as the then-planet Pluto had).
4. The difficulty in verifying what the solution would look like. For some
insight problems, there are visible and recognized solutions states. For ex-
ample, the goal state for reversing the triangle and moving three sticks is pre-
sented as the problem solver begins to solve the problem. In other puzzles,
such as the nine-dot problem, the goal state is presented in a more abstract
way and is not directly visible (MacGregor, Ormerod, and Chronicle, 2001). In
the same way, some goal states of real-life insight problems may be visible
and the problem is rather how to reach them. For example, how can the climber
reach the summit? In other cases, the goal state is represented in some more
abstract sense, such as: What is the structure of DNA?
5. The sequential character of the problem. Insight problem solving might
not always involve one major “Aha” moment or major step, but may instead
involve a sequence of steps (Weisberg, 1986; Perkins, 1981). MacGregor,
Ormerod, and Chronicle (2001) suggested that the nine-dot problem might
have many of the same qualities as hill climbing and involve a number of
“look-ahead” strategies. The “aha” experience might illustrate the sequences
after the insights have occurred (Chronicle et al, 2004) that occur in problem
solving.
Similar sequences might have occurred for Mendeleev as he tried to
develop a way to display the chemical elements in his textbook. As a first step,
he was able to reduce the number of comparisons and see patterns when he
compared the elements on their atomic properties and ordered them accord-
ing to their atomic weights. Before the second breakthough occurred, he was
under pressure to finish his work because he was leaving on a trip the next
day. Because handwriting was cumbersome and because he was a player of
the card game patience, he might have quickly grasped the idea of using
cards to organize the elements (Akin, Akin & Heinz III, 1996).
In organizing the elements, the cards allowed him to see an order of how
the properties of the elements can be ordered in a periodic relationship to
their weights. One dimension represented the atomic weight and the second
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was the general chemical properties. He also saw that there were gaps be-
cause of unknown elements. This was the insight that was needed because he
was previously expecting that everything might fit in a 2 X 2 matrix. One of
the greatest contributions of the table was in helping people recognize that
other elements might exit, thus encouraging further discovery.
6. Figure-ground property. Some insight problems involve figure ground
reversals that appear to be analogous to those involved in reversible figures.
With such images, like the candlestick/two faces shown in Figure 2, focusing
on one makes it impossible to see the second. When the candlestick interpre-
tation is focal, the “two faces” interpretation becomes background and
remains unseen, and vice versa. Reversible figures provide a striking percep-
tual demonstration of how we can restructure or see a situation in different
ways at different times. A similar type of conceptual restructuring may result
in an insight, by bringing into immediate perspective a solution which we were
not previously able to see.
FIGURE 2. The Candlestick-Two Faces Reversing Figure.
Application
Our theory focuses on the characteristics of insight problems and the implica-
tion that some problems illustrate more characteristics of restructuring (Weisberg,
1996; Isaak & Just, 1996). Understanding a problem’s characteristics might pro-
vide an understanding of why some problems are more difficult than others or
how different problem solving strategies might be more useful than others. These
characteristics might allow us to understand the differences between puzzle-like
problems such as the nine-dot problem, and real ones, such as Mendeleev was
trying to solve in developing a classification of chemical elements.
Hypothesis 1: Insight problems which share common restructuring char-
acteristics may exhibit similar levels of difficulty. In previous experiment, we
compared performance on rebus problems with a theoretical measure of
difficulty (MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008). In this research, we examine
the correlations among classical-type problems, and whether different groups
of problems differ systematically in difficulty.
Classification of insight problems
Table 2 shows how we classified the 10 insight problems, where each of the
6 characteristics represents a type of restructuring which has to occur to solve
a problem. As is shown, all of these problems were judged to require the spatial
re-arrangement of objects (moving coins or sticks), a characteristic which may
be typical of certain puzzle-like insight problems.
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All of the problems were judged to involve a misdirect. However, the other char-
acteristics were distributed among the problems in different ways, suggesting that
problems may tend to group in a number of possible combinations.
For example, the first three problems in group 1 require that a problem solver
disassemble an existing structure before restructuring. The coin triangle starts
from a specific organization or configuration which must be disorganized before
TABLE 2. Assessment of Types of Restructuring Required for Solving Insight
Problems.
Need to Need to Difficulty in (a) More
(a) change spatial disassemble conceptualizing than one
Problem assumptions existing Degree solution in insight Figure
definition or (b) compute structures or of starting or required groundalternative forms Misdirect (b) verifying in reversal
forms in before insightful problem-
restructuring restructuring solution solving
Move 3
coins to 1(a) 1 1 0 0 0reverse
triangle
Move 3
sticks to 1(a) 1 1 0 0 0change
pattern
Arrange 6
coins to 1(a) 1 1 1(a) 0 0
touch
Divide pigs
in pigpen 1(a) 0 1 1(a) 0 0
Arrange 5
pieces in 1(a) 0 1 1(a) 1 1
a cross
Arrange
12 discs 1(a) 0 1 1(a)(b) 1 0
Arrange
12 cards 1(a) 0 1 1(a) 0 1
in a grid
Separate
animals 1(a)(b) 0 1 1(a) 0 0
into 4 pens
Divide field
field into 1(a)(b) 0 1 1(a) 0 0four equal
parts
Connect the
necklace 1(a)(b) 1 1 0 0 0
strands
1
6
4
4
4
4
4
7
4
4
4
4
4
8
2
6
4
4
7
4
4
8
3
64
44
47
44
44
8
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being reconfigured. The sticks problem is similar, in that the problem involves
reversing the orientation of the given shape. The six coin problem does not intrin-
sically involve a given starting organization but it did so in the form that we used
in the study below, because the coins were arranged initially in a specific topo-
logical relationship. Two of the first three problems (triangle and sticks) shared a
second characteristic, that the precise “shape” of the solution was provided as
part of the problem description. As a result, problem solvers can clearly concep-
tualize what the solution will look like when they commence problem solving.
Although the first four problems have similar characteristics involving the chang-
ing spatial assumptions and misdirection, there are slight differences. The 6 coin
and the pigpen problem are different from others in the group in that problem
solvers are not clear on what the solution might look like when they begin prob-
lem solving. In addition, in the pigpen problem, problem solvers do not have dis-
assemble an existing structure before restructuring.
The next 3 problems in group 2 are similar to those in group 1 in that they
involve the spatial re-arrangement of objects and misdirection. None of these prob-
lems require disassembly of an existing form, nor do problem solvers have a
clear model of what the solution will look like. Two of problems in this group are
unique in that they require a sequence of insights in solving. The 12 discs prob-
lem, for example, requires (a) using the third dimension, by stacking discs, and
(b) placing them on intersections rather than edges. Solving the cross problem
may also require two restructurings, of (a) placing the dominant piece diagonally
rather than horizontally or vertically, and (b) seeing the “notch” as an interior
corner rather than as a gap that must be squared off. This latter restructuring is
also an example of figure-ground reversal, where the notch transforms from
being seen as a hole that must be filled with part of another piece (figure) to a
space between two figural components of the cross. The third problem in this
group, the 12 cards problem, also requires a figure-ground reversal. In this case,
the problem solver has to stop focusing on the cards and begin focusing on the
space where the cards are arranged. Or, to put it another way, to switch from
thinking that there are “too many cards” to thinking “there is not enough space”
to arrange them in.
The final three problems, on first appearance, illustrate many of the same char-
acteristics as in group 1. However, the problems are unique in that, in addition to
changing spatial assumptions, problem solvers have to perform some form of
computation. In the field problem, the problem solver has to compute how to
place 27 animals in 4 pens so that there is an odd number of animals in each pen;
in the necklace problem, the problem solver has to calculate how to connect the
four pieces of a necklace within the cost constraint of $15.00, where it costs $2 to
open a link and $3 to close a link. The field problem involves a different sort of
calculation of first dividing the field equally where one of the solution paths can
be created by first dividing the field into 12 smaller squares where it is easier to
see the solution. Weisberg (1996) suggests that the field and the necklace prob-
lems are hybrids as they might also be solved without insight. That is, the prob-
lem solver might solve these problems without any deep analysis by simply trying
various combinations.
The foregoing classification should be regarded as provisional, since it is based
on a small sample of problems, and approximate, since it is based on subjective
judgment. In addition, we assigned problems a score of either 1 or 0 on each
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dimension, whereas problems might more realistically vary on a scale between 0
and 1. Furthermore, the dimensions we identified are not necessarily equally im-
portant, whereas our classification has essentially given them equal weighting.
Nevertheless, it provides an initial typology of problems against which to com-
pare the empirical findings below.
REMOTE ASSOCIATES TEST (RAT) ITEMS AND REBUS PUZZLES
In addition to the 10 spatial problems described above we used a set of Remote
Associates Test (RAT) items (Mednick, 1962; Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003b).
The task in a RAT problem is, given three words, to find a fourth word that con-
nects them. (For example, lick, mine, shaker: Answer, salt.) RAT problems
require problem solvers to search for distantly related information, and have
become a benchmark test of creativity (Mednick, 1962). RAT items have been
used as stimuli in previous studies of insight and related phenomena (Ansburg,
2000; Beeman & Bowden, 2000; Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003a; Bowers,
Regehr, Balthazard & Parker, 1990; Dallob & Dominowski, 1993; Schooler &
Melcher, 1995; Smith & Blankenship, 1991; Wiley, 1998). Evidence that RAT items
are solved by insight has been presented in the form of correlations with perfor-
mance on insight problems (Ansburg, 2000) and correlations of rated insight
with degree of solution priming (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003a).
In addition to RAT items, we also used rebus puzzles (also known as “wordies”).
Rebus problems combine verbal and visual or spatial cues that have to be
deciphered into a common phrase or saying (for example you just me = “just
between you and me”). Rebus puzzles have been used to study the insight-related
phenomena of fixation and incubation (Smith & Blankenship, 1989). Recently,
we reported experimental evidence indicating that rebus puzzles operate like in-
sight problems (MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008).
RAT items and rebus puzzles are alike in that both are verbal. However, they
differ in that rebus puzzles also typically involve visual or spatial elements as
critical components of the problem. We re-examined our previous classification
of 152 rebus puzzles (MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008) and found that 82%
involved spatial relationships or other visual cues. It has been suggested that there
are differences between spatial and verbal insight problems (Dow & Mayer, 2004).
We conjecture that rebus puzzles, since they typically involve spatial and verbal
elements, should overlap with both spatial and verbal insight problems to a greater
extent than spatial and verbal problems do with each other.
Hypothesis 2. Performance scores on rebus puzzles will correlate more
highly with performance on classic-type spatial insight problems and
with RAT items than spatial problems and RAT items will correlate with
each other.
METHOD
Participants
The participants were 256 student volunteers at the University of Waikato in
New Zealand. Our New Zealand colleagues administered the procedure during
November of 2007 to four separate third year classes in the Faculty of Business
Administration. The findings reported here are based on a sub-sample of 172
native English speakers, consisting of 84 males and 88 females, ranging in age
from under 20 to approximately 30 years.
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DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
Test materials consisted of the10 classic-type spatial insight problems described
in the previous section and 24 RAT (Remote Associates Test) problems and 24
rebus puzzles. We also included a test of fluid intelligence, the Esoteric Analogies
Test (Kleitman, Stankov, & Marsh, 2003; Stankov, Danthiir, Williams, Pallier, Rob-
erts, & Gordon, 2006). This provided a means of assessing whether performance
on the other tasks could be explained in terms of fluid intelligence alone. To con-
trol for possible order effects, we used four versions of the battery of tests that
varied the order of blocks of items. Generally, each version began with a set of
5 insight problems, followed by the RAT (or rebus) problems, followed by the
rebus (or RAT) problems, followed by 5 more insight problems. All four versions
ended with the 24 item Esoteric Analogies Test. Participants were allowed 15
minutes for each set of 5 classic-type insight problems (3 minutes per problem)
and 12 minutes each for the RAT, rebus and Esoteric Analogies tests (30s per
item). We selected the RAT items to provide a range of difficulty level based on
previous findings (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003a; Bowden & Jung-Beeman,
2003b). Similarly, we selected rebus problems to reflect different levels of diffi-
culty based on our previously developed restructuring index (MacGregor and
Cunningham, 2008).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We assigned a score of 1 to correct solutions and 0 to incorrect or no solutions.
Table 3 provides the point biserial correlation coefficients among the 10 classic-
type insight problems. The mean proportion of correct solutions for the different
problem types are presented in Table 4. Table 5 reports correlations between
performance on groupings of insight problems and scores on the rebus, RAT,
and analogies tests.
The results in Table 3 indicate that problems within each of the three groups
are generally inter-correlated, although some of the problems in group 1 and 2
are also correlated with each other. For group 1, the six correlation coefficients
ranged from 0.11 to 0.27, with five of the six significant at p<.05. For group 2, the
correlations ranged from 0.21 to 0.27, and all three were significant. Of the three
in group 3, only the correlation of 0.26, between the necklace and field problems,
was significant. These last three problems had the lowest solution rates, and trun-
cated range may have been a factor in the low correlations. Gilhooly and Murphy
(2005) used both the necklace and field problems in their cluster analysis of
insight and non-insight problems. Their analysis placed the necklace problem
in a cluster whose other members were considered to be non-insight problems
(syllogisms and the Tower of London problem). The field problem was rarely
solved in the 5 minute time period, and was dropped from their analysis (Gilhooly
& Murphy, 2005).
The results also indicated considerable overlap between the group 1 and group
2 problems. In this case, the correlations ranged from 0.02 to 0.32, and 10 of
the 12 coefficients were significant. This is perhaps not surprising, as all of
these problems involve the need to change spatial assumptions in restructuring.
However, we note that, of the seven problems in groups 1 and 2, two (12 discs)
correlated with those in group 3, which consisted of problems that also involve
computations.
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TABLE 3. Intercorrelations of performance on 10 classic-type insight problems
(N = 172).
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Move Move Arrange Arrange Move Arrange Divide Connect Separate
3 3 6 coins Divide pieces 12 12 field the animals
coins coins to touch pigs in cross discs cards in  into necklace into 4a grid parts strands pens
Move 3
coins to 1reverse
triangle
Move 3
sticks to .25 1change
pattern
Arrange
6 coins .16 .20 1
to touch
Divide
pigs in .11 .24 .27 1
pigpen
Arrange
5 pieces .29 .27 .15 .16 1
in a cross
Move 12
discs .20 .02 .20 .32 .27 1
Arrange
12 cards .18 .28 .14 .26 .25 .21 1
in a grid
Divide
field into
four .06 .14 .11 –.05 .17 .02 –.01 1
equal
parts
Connect
the –.03 –.05 –.01 .14 .07 .22 –.03 .26 1necklace
strands
Separate
animals .09 .00 .03 –.07 .07 –.06 –.05 –.04 –.02 1into 4
pens
Correlations of r = > 0.15 significant at p = .05
The goal of this analysis is not to define groupings which are absolute, but to
indicate that a problem’s characteristics might be a reasonable way to approach
the uniqueness of, and commonalities among, insight problems. The correlation
results provide only partial support for the first hypothesis, which proposed that
276
Categories of insight and their correlates
insight problems may be classified according to common characteristics. Prob-
lems in group 1 appear to be interrelated, although there might be an argument
to consider two subgroups: (i) the triangle and sticks, and (ii) 6 coin and pigpen.
The problems in group 2 also appear to be similar, and their inter-correlations
with problems in group 1 might reflect the fact that they all require the need to
adjust spatial assumptions in restructuring. The problems in group 3 seem to be
different from the other problems and, while the field and necklace problem were
correlated, the animals problem was unrelated to others, with correlations rang-
ing from –0.07 to 0.09. This may be attributed to its exceptionally low solution
rate, of 1%.
In providing further support for hypothesis 1, Table 4 summarizes performance
on classic-type insight problems and on the RAT, Rebus, and analogy test items.
Overall, participants solved 25% of the classic-type insight problems (s =19%). It
is clear that problem solvers found some problems more difficult to solve than
others, and this difficulty might be affected by characteristics of the problems.
Specifically, difficulty levels seem to map onto the proposed groupings of prob-
lems, with group 1 having the highest solution rates, ranging from 57% to 33%,
followed by group 2, from 24% to 17%, then group 3, from 7% down to 1%.
Within group 1, the coin triangle and sticks problems had substantially higher
solution rates than the 6 coin and pigpen problems, possibly because the goal
states in the latter cases were provided in abstract terms only. Problems in
group 2 were somewhat more difficult, possibly reflecting the fact that two of
these problems require more than one insight. While the cards problem appears
to require only one insight — that the table can have gaps – having this realization
does not necessarily lead directly to a solution. We observed a number of at-
tempted solutions with gaps that nevertheless were incomplete or incorrect.
Our second hypothesis proposed that scores on rebus puzzles would correlate
more highly with both spatial insight and RAT problems than the latter two would
correlate with each other. The relevant findings are reported in the first two rows
of Table 5. The correlation between the mean solution rates of rebus and insight
TABLE 4. Performance on Problems (Proportion Correct) N = 172.
Problem
Proportion correct
Mean Standard deviation
Move 3 coins to reverse triangle .57 .50
Move 3 sticks to change pattern .49 .50
Arrange 6 coins to touch .38 .49
Divide pigs in pigpen .33 .47
Arrange 5 pieces in a cross .24 .42
Move 12 discs .22 .41
Arrange  12 cards in a grid .17 .38
Divide field into four equal parts .07 .26
Connect the necklace strands .05 .21
Separate animals into 4 pens .01 .11
Average for all 10 problems .25 .19
Rebus problems .30 .15
RAT problems .21 .13
Analogies. .46 .19
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problems was 0.36 and between rebus and mean RAT scores, 0.40. The correla-
tion between insight scores and RAT scores was 0.20. While all three coefficients
were significant (p <.01), both of the correlations involving rebus scores were
significantly greater than the correlation between insight and RAT scores (both
p’s < .05). The findings supported the second hypothesis.
In addition, we used a verbal measure of fluid intelligence, the Esoteric Analo-
gies Test, to investigate whether the correlations among the presumed insight
problems could be explained simply on the basis of differences in intelligence
scores. Previous findings have indicated that RAT performance correlates with
verbal intelligence (Harris, 2004; Mednick & Andrews, 1967), and we wished to
take any influences of this factor into account. From the third row of Table 5. it
can be seen that the Esoteric Analogies scores correlated modestly, but signifi-
cantly, with all three presumed indicators of insight. Although its correlation with
the RAT (0.31) was slightly higher than with the spatial insight and rebus prob-
lems (0.25 and 0.27, respectively), the differences were not significant.
TABLE 5. Correlations between mean solution rates for spatial insight problems,
Rebus puzzles, RAT items, Esoteric Analogies, and categories of
spatial insight problems.
Insight Rebus RAT Analogies Insight 1 Insight 2
Rebus .36 —
RAT .20 .40 —
Analogies .25 .27 .31 —
Insight 1 .31 .14 .19 —
Insight 2 .35 .21 .19 .46 —
Insight 3 .00 .09 .15 .11 .13
n = 172, r = 0.15 significant at .05 (underlined); r = 0.21 significant at p < .01 (bold).
To test whether rebus scores correlated with spatial insight independently of
the measure of fluid intelligence, we used hierarchical regression analysis, with
spatial insight scores as dependent variable and analogies, RAT and rebus scores
as independent variables, entered in that order. The results indicated that rebus
performance continued to significantly predict performance on the spatial insight
problems, while controlling for the effects of both fluid intelligence and remote
associates performance, Fchange (1, 167) = 14.98, p < .001. The results provided
further evidence for the second hypothesis.
We conducted a similar test to examine whether rebus performance accounts
for verbal insight problem solving, independently of fluid intelligence, by using
RAT scores as the dependent variable and analogies and rebus scores as inde-
pendent variables, entered in that order. The results showed that rebus perfor-
mance remained a significant predictor of RAT scores while controlling for fluid
intelligence, Fchange (1, 168) = 23.26, p < .001. The result supports the conclusion
that solving rebus and RAT problems involves processing that is not completely
captured by a verbal measure of fluid intelligence. As a whole, the pattern of
results is consistent with the conclusion that spatial and verbal insight problem
solving are not identical, that neither can be accounted for wholly in terms of
individual differences in fluid intelligence, and that rebus puzzles appear to
involve aspects of both
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The last three rows of Table 5 show the correlations among variables broken
down by the three categories of spatial insight problem. The results here are rel-
evant to both hypotheses. The three correlations at the bottom right of the table
substantiate the earlier conclusion, that group 1 and group 2 problems share
some similarities while differing from the group 3 problems. Earlier, we had con-
sidered that the low correlations involving group 3 problems might have been
due to the effects of truncated range in the latter problems, because of low solu-
tion rates. However, it can be seen that the mean scores for the three problems
in group 3 correlated significantly with the test of fluid intelligence. This is open
to several possible interpretations. It may be that the problems in group 3 are
so difficult beyond the supposed critical insight that their solution requires sub-
stantial general intellectual ability that masks any independent contribution of
“insight ability”. On the other hand, perhaps some of the problems in this group
do not involve insight. For example, Gilhooly and Murphy (2005) used the neck-
lace problem in their cluster analysis of insight and non-insight problems, and it
was placed in a cluster of “non-insight” problems. In either case, the results lend
further support to the first hypothesis, in distinguishing group 3 problems from
those of groups 1 and 2.
The results in the second column of the table indicate that rebus puzzles were
related to the first two groups of spatial insight problems but not to the third.
Hierarchical regression analysis using group 1 scores as dependent variable and
analogies, RAT and rebus performance as independent variables (entered in that
order) confirmed that rebus scores predicted insight performance independently
of the combined effects of fluid intelligence and remote associates performance,
Fchange (1, 167) =11.60, p = .001. A parallel analysis showed this to be true when
using group 2 scores as dependent variable, Fchange (1, 167) =14.55, p < .001. In
addition, the results indicated that RAT scores were significantly related to group
2 insight scores, while controlling for the effects of fluid intelligence, Fchange (1,168)
= 4.48, p < .05, but not to group 1 insight scores, Fchange (1,168) = 1.15.
In relating the results to the classification scheme proposed in Table 2, several
possibilities arise. There appear to be two factors that may account for the
observed relationship between rebus puzzles and the group 1 spatial insight prob-
lems. First, rebus puzzles may share the property of requiring a shift in spatial
assumptions (for example, a shift in thinking of component A being above com-
ponent B to component B being below component A). Second, rebus puzzles
may often require breaking an existing form (for example, by not reading from
left to right or from top to bottom). Rebus puzzles also share characteristics with
group 2 insight problems, including changing spatial assumptions and initial dif-
ficulty in conceptualizing the solution. Also, like group 2 problems, rebus puzzles
may require more than one insight to solve (MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008).
RAT problems also may share several properties with group 2 problems, which
could account for the relationship between them. Like group 2 problems, RAT
items typically do not require breaking an existing structure, while they do present
initial difficulty in conceptualizing the solution. Also, RAT items may require some-
thing that is analogous to more than one insight. For example, with an item such
as stick, maker, point (answer: match), the solution creates three compound
words that are members of different categories, compared with base, basket,
foot (answer: ball), whose solution produces compound words from a single cat-
egory. However, further research is required to determine whether the character-
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istics proposed here can account for the patterns of relationships observed among
the different problem types.
This research suggests that there may be different categories of insight prob-
lems depending on the characteristics of the restructurings required to solve them.
Insight problems might require: (i) changes in spatial and physical assumptions,
(ii) changing defined structures and forms, (iii) misdirection, (iv) abstract and
non-visualized goals, (v) number or restructuring sequences, and (vi) figure-
ground type reversals. While previous descriptions of the properties of insight
problems have tended to apply to insight problems in general (Bowden & Beeman,
1998; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Weisberg, 1996), we believe that the six charac-
teristics presented here may provide a start to exploring in what ways problems
may involve different types of insight. As such, different problem solving strate-
gies, and different forms of training, may be more appropriate for different types
of problems. Future research may determine how different insight characteristics
relate to the relative difficulty in solving problems.
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